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Dale Maharidge  
and Michael Williamson’s ‘Homeland’:  
de-constructing the rhetoric of consensus  
in the aftermath of September 11th attacks 
 
by Cinzia Schiavini 
Two days before Christmas 2001, I drove west 
over the George Washington Bridge, into 
Homeland America. Fifteen weeks had passed 
since I’d stood on my uptown rooftop and 
watched the second tower fall, the clouds 
billowing over lower Manhattan. That day my 
gaze was drawn beyond the New Jersey 
Palisades; I wondered about the middle of the 
country. I knew that a genie had been uncorked. I 
of course had no idea what the genie would do 
(Maharidge 2004: xli). 
 
 
Recounting September 11th, its meanings and consequences on American social 
texture not through the representation of the wounded city, but through its absence. 
In the aftermath of an event that embodied the attack to the “centre” – of the nation, 
of the globalized capital and the First World power – there have not been many 
narratives that resisted the impetus to fill that geographical and symbolic void with 
words or images of the Towers’ fall, and rather chose to examine its reverberations on 
the margins of the country. Writer Dale Maharidge and photographer Michael 
Williamson’s Homeland takes a ground-level view of the impact of 9/11 events and the 
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government’s policies of the following two years by exploring the lives of ordinary 
people in the heartland of the country.  
“Go where no one is going” has always been the motto of their “Star Trek 
journalism” ( Maharidge 2004: 183), that previously stemmed from the scenarios of 
homelessness and (agricultural) poverty: while their first work,  Journey to Nowhere 
(1985) depicted the effects of de-industrialization on the Rust Belt working class, And 
Their Children After Them. The Legacy of ‘Let Us Now Praise Famous Men’ (1989) 
retraced the footsteps of Agee and Evans’ reportage on the world of the Alabama 
sharecroppers in the Great Depression forty years later, during the economic 
downturn that marked the shift from the industrial to the post-industrial economy. 
In Homeland too, Maharidge’s words and Williamson’s images re-affirm both the 
bonds to the documentary tradition of the previous decades and the urge to redefine 
the shifting landscapes of the margins: from the Rust Belt to Tennessee and to 
Chicago’s South Side, the writer and the photographer investigate and document 
geographical areas plunged by decades in the economic recession and social tensions, 
and try to interpret their response to American rhetoric and politics after the terrorists’ 
attacks.  
Homeland examines in particular the manipulative use of 9/11 and the 
subsequent call for patriotism made by the government officials in order to 
strengthen the consent and support the (foreign) aggressive and (domestic) repressive 
political turn. By focusing on the social peripheries, both rural and urban, the text 
dissects the hegemonic discourse on 9/11 through a narrative made of the “voices of 
the others” – where “otherness” crosses the boundaries of ethnicity and thrust its roots 
in a long standing economic and social unease. Political discourse of the post 9/11 is 
depicted by Maharidge as the attempt to sew once again together a nation long split 
in two along class lines: “The coast and some who dwell there are another America 
apart from the rotting barns and dead Main Streets in the middle: two halves of a 
society, each unknown to the other – one comprised of the Visibles, the other the 
Invisibles” (Maharidge 2004: 66) – these last including 13,5 million American children 
living in poverty. 
Against the “state of exception” that the government aimed at creating, first 
culturally and then socially in order to increase its power, 1 Maharidge and Williamson’s 
purpose is to re-inscribe the events of September 11 in the flow of historical and 
                                                
1 No doubt that media language and content have been deeply affected by the 9/11 events. And 
since culture do not only reproduces discourses, but co-produces them, the ways arts, be they visual or 
literary, have depicted the tragedy cast light on the relation between the private and public spheres, 
between the audience’s emotional response and its wilful manipulation. Many critics noted for example 
the “death of irony” that followed the Twin Towers’ attack in fictional series, some of which incorporated 
the drama of 9/11 in the plot of ordinary lives (24 or Law & Order). By depicting a “state of exception”, 
these cultural products have thus suggested that the disrespect of criminals’ rights and dignity can 
become necessary to prevent the loss of innocent lives. 
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economic continuum that has shaped domestic and foreign politics during the last 
century of American imperialism. Their first step is to focus on the construction of the 
meaning of terror and terror attacks and the following counter-actions as strategic 
elements in the manipulation of the public opinion and its emotional response. Their 
investigation shows the extent to which the war on terror becomes within the national 
boundaries also a war for terror, a permanent state of tension aimed at controlling and 
repressing (sometimes with the active involvement of private citizens) the most varied 
manifestation of dissent.  
In Maharidge and Williamson’s footsteps, this essay deals with the de-
construction of the discursive and cultural strategies of the “state of exception” 
employed by the hegemonic discourse and with the dialectics between domestic and 
international politics. The analysis focuses in particular on four elements: the concepts 
of “Ground Zero” and “Homeland” and their use as lexical and symbolic catalysts of 
nationalism; the forms and the erasure of dissent; the commodification of 9/11 and the 
“War on Terror”; and the relation between the national rhetoric and the transnational 
economy of the last two decades. 
 
 
REFRAMING WORDS: FROM “GROUND ZERO” TO “HOMELAND” 
 
The resort to the “state of exception” has a long history in American experience, 
from Thomas Paine’s The American Crisis (1776-1783) onward. America’s fall from 
innocence has always relied on the pattern of a continuing negotiation between 
traumatic events that supposedly stop the flow of time and the return to a primeval 
state of unity through a response matching the power of such ruptures. As Stuart Croft 
makes clear in his Culture, Crisis, and America’s War on Terror (2006: 6), 9/11 is only the 
latest of the historical traumas accentuating the pre-existing anxieties in American 
society that hegemonic culture has used to create unity and consent (Nardin, 2006). 
The transformation of the trauma into a cohesive catalyst always implies the use 
of symbolic elements, be they visual (images), lexical (words), or abstract (ideas). 
Among the symbols with multiple meanings, whose significance has been radically re-
contextualized after (and sometimes even before) the attacks, two in particular 
deserve close analysis: Ground Zero and Homeland – the first being in Maharidge’s 
account and in Williamson’s images the invisible (save once) centre, the latter the 
ideological and geographical reverberation of the former and the core of the 
reportage. 
As Amy Kaplan notes, both Ground Zero and Homeland are evocative spatial 
metaphors, words that “produce meanings – and preclude other meanings – both for 
the events that have come to be known as 9/11 and for the changing images of US 
nationhood and its relation to the world outside it” (2003: 82). Ground Zero, as a 
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proper name, refers to the one-block site in downtown Manhattan previously 
occupied by the World Trade Center towers; but it also entered in the American 
sociolect as a synonym first the wounded city, then of the terrorists’ attacks and their 
consequences.  
Due mainly to the highly evocative power of the Twin Towers in American 
imagination, Ground Zero has unquestionably become the core of United States 
imagination of disasters. A striking architectural work and the symbol of capitalism, 
the World Trade Centre was one of the most effective synthesis of the “society of the 
spectacle” – this latter being, in Guy Debord’s famous aphorism, “capital accumulated 
to the point where it becomes image”.2 However, in the transformation of the Twin 
Towers into the symbol of 9/11, another declination of the spectacle itself has played a 
key role: that is, the ceaseless re-consumption of their fall (with their unquestionable 
titillation to voyeurism) made possible by the abundance of photographic and video-
recording testimonies.  
The rush to memorialise the event, building narratives that intertwine private 
and public experience in order to bring together those who were made felt threatened 
by the attacks, led not only to the feeling of community deriving from a common loss 
(and the subsequent manipulation from grief to patriotism), but also to an increase of 
the invisibility of the other dramas outside the institutionalised one-block perimeter of 
grief. From the journalistic Jim Dwyer’s 102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to 
Survive Inside the Twin Towers (2005) to Don De Lillo’s Falling Man (2007) and other 
fictional and non-fictional works, many are the narratives which have focused almost 
exclusively on the events in New York City. In this overproduction of images, words are 
easily torn out of the lexicon of warfare, their original meaning erased. In this common 
forgetfulness, only few people noticed that, whereas the 9/11 attacks were being 
repeatedly compared to Pearl Harbour (Riffin 2004), the term “Ground Zero” was 
coined and referred to the havoc of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Redfield 2009: 23). The 
fact that “Ground Zero” calls up the ghost of the first atomic bombs, and thus United 
States’  part of agent, rather than victim, of mass destruction, is a contradiction many 
preferred not to linger on, and has been unveiled only recently, in a new stage of 
American foreign relations.3 
Like “Ground Zero”, “Homeland” too is a term deeply embedded in political and 
academic discourse, and it has made a dramatic comeback since 1990. As Richard 
                                                
2 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (1967), quoted in Retort, “Afflicted Powers. The State, 
the Spectacle and September 11”, New Left Review 27, May-June 2004, pp. 14. 
3 “Hiroshima: Ground Zero 1945”, an exhibition at the International Centre of Photography (May 
20th - August 29th, 2011) of sixty prints drawn from an archive of more than seven hundred photographs 
taken by United States soldiers on November 1945, do not only testify the effects of the atomic 
devastation through the (top secret) work of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, but directly 
creates a parallel between the since now opposed fronts. It is significant that these documents, found 
by chance in 2000, have been made public only eleven years later, after the end of Bush administration. 
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Nostrand explains (2001), “homeland” is an umbrella-term usually founded on the 
relation between a specific group of people, often racially homogeneous, their 
identity, a place they feel they are bonded to (due to past times), and the control (or 
the will of control) of that place over time. By stressing the sense of native origins, 
birthplace, common bloodlines and racial and ethnic homogeneity, the term 
“homeland” has often come to identify an aspiration more than a reality, a wishful 
thinking or nostalgia (as in the case of the trauma of uprooting or broken connections 
to the past). Historically however the term has been employed in two very specific 
historical contexts in modern history: first, during the Weimar Republic in Germany, 
from the end of World War I to Hitler’s ascent in 1933 – when the concept of Heimat 
evoked a military glorious and economically prosperous past the nationalists aspired 
to return to (Wickham 1999). More recently, “homeland”  was given an even more 
negative racist connotation when it was used by South-African regime in 1969 as a 
synonym of “racial purity”. Building the very idea of citizenship on nativist ground, 
homeland implies then a process of re-ethnicising political affiliation, that has been 
historically coded, as Maskovsky and Cunningham note, “as both white and 
Christian.”(Maskovsky 2009: 188)   
In a nation of immigrants like the United States, the term used to refer either to 
Native American cultures and regions, or to the home-countries left by immigrants 
and by those African slaves deported in the American colonies. “Homeland” defined 
then not the here, but the elsewhere – be it in time (Native tribes before their 
displacement) or in space (the home-countries on the other side of the Atlantic ocean). 
The significance of the term began to change at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, when “homeland” was used to define the regions (like Appalachia or the 
Middle West) people of no special ethnicity derived an affiliation with, based on their 
dwelling in those areas, and on the (often artificial) common traditions and cultural 
memories they shared (Shapiro 1977). By stressing a mythic past engrained in the land, 
“homeland” opposed from here onward to the traditional boundless and mobile 
image of American nationhood, and became the antithesis to the notion of “Nation of 
Futurity” that had since then shaped its social and political vision (Collins 2007).  
Its reactionary connotation further increased during the last two decades, mainly 
as a response to the disruptive effects on American society of the transnational 
economic turn after the 1994 N.A.F.T.A. agreements. In order to cement, at least 
ideologically, the national borders (increasingly mined by the flow of people, capitals 
and goods), the representatives of the Government evoked more and more a 
“homeland” resembling those of the European past, based on the sense of loyalty and 
belonging to the whole country, with an increasing emphasis on the symbols and 
landmarks of nationhood and peoplehood. 
However, as Michael Conzen underlines, “Loyalty is not simply the existence of a 
generalized group ‘sense of place’ or ‘love of place’. It is rather an imperative to defend 
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the territory because by so doing, and at times only by so doing, is one able to defend 
the culture itself” (Nostrand 2001:  254). Although the term was already part of the 
rhetoric of the Democratic years, in the transition from Clinton to Bush presidency 
“homeland” became more and more equated with a vulnerable domestic space in 
need of protection, an uncanny nation that had to root its sense of identity while 
opposing to an external, menacing enemy. This re-coding of the term was particularly 
poignant in a moment when, due to the permeability of the national borders by the 
fluxes of globalization, no-one feels to live at safe distance from conflicts any more. As 
Kaplan notes,  
 
Although homeland security may strive to cordon off the nation as a domestic 
space from external foreign threats, it is actually about breaking down the 
boundaries between inside and outside, about seeing the homeland in a state of 
constant emergency from threats within and without. […] Homeland security 
depends on a radical insecurity, where the home itself serves as the battleground. 
[…] Homeland security calls for a vast new intrusions of government, military, and 
intelligence forces, not just to secure the homeland from external threats, but to 
become an integral part of the workings of home, a home in continual state of 
emergency (2003: 90).  
 
It was then not by chance that “homeland” (together with the discursive shift 
from “national defence” to “homeland security”) became a recurrent term in the 1990s 
to justify the multi-front role of the US armies abroad: the relation between securing 
the homeland and enforcing national power abroad has been the leitmotif of the 
political rhetoric from the Kuwait invasion onward (Ibid.: 87), culminating (and not 
originating) in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. After Ground Zero, however, the 
dividing line between “us” and “them” cut even more across both domestic and 
international peripheries – in a reconfiguration of spaces of risks as a network of 
circuits connecting the permeable borders and the cities (un-American and havens for 
minority groups) that allegedly required an even stricter surveillance and control of 
dissent.4   
 
 
THE SILENCE OF THE OTHERS: CONSENT AND DISSENT AFTER 9/11  
 
                                                
4 As Conzen notes, in the United States the display of patriotism has been particularly evident in 
the rural areas: “As a class of space, cities are poor locales in which to seek homeland dynamics, except 
as articulation points for the political mobilization of cultural self-determination in the surrounding 
region. […] But as often, cities have been, and are, tools of empire and subjugation, key venues for 
challenging the homeland sentiment among subordinate peoples with the symbols and institutions of 
the dominating culture” (Nostrand 2001: 257). 
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The lexical convergence between American and German concept of “Homeland” 
mirrors deeper and more disquieting parallels between the two nations and their 
histories. As far as the strengthening of consent in social practices, Maharidge 
underlines how signs of patriotic affiliation were subject to a rapid increase after both 
the fall of the towers and the fire of the Reichstag. The imperative call for consensus 
had, as a consequence, the eradication of dissent, that after 9/11 coupled with 
different forms of militarization of every-day life. Together with acts of unity under the 
common grief, this state of surveillance ended up eroding what had been until that 
moment uncontested civil liberties, both in the private and in the public sphere – so 
that, as Maharidge remarks, “being united meant not talking to certain people […] 
being united meant not asking any questions” (Maharidge 2004: 76). 
The loyalty to one’s country based on the subversion of its ideological premises 
is not an exception in history: as Chris Hedges notes in his highly acclaimed War is a 
Force That Gives Us Meaning,  
 
In wartime the state seeks to destroy its own culture. It is only when this destruction 
has been completed that the state can begin to exterminate the culture of its 
opponents. In times of conflict authentic culture is subversive. As the cause 
championed by the state comes to define national identity, as the myth of war 
entices a nation to glory and sacrifice, those who question the value of the cause 
and the veracity of the myths are branded internal enemies (2003: 62)  
 
One of the most important right is the freedom of speech. Homeland first one 
third is devoted to the sixteen-years-old student Katie Sierra’s struggle in the small 
town of Sissonville, where she was both denied by the school principal the permission 
to form an anarchy club and suspended for wearing clothes with handwritten 
messages objecting to U.S militarism, racism and homophobia. Despite the initial lack 
of media coverage, Katie became via Internet the symbol of the many protesters 
removed from their positions or fired because of their dissenting views about US 
policy. Her taking a stand is significant not in the act itself, but when compared to the 
general silence: as Maharidge notes, “Katie spoke out in the face of tremendous 
adversity. It’s shocking that in a country as huge as America, so many who should have 
been speaking out were silent during the first post 9/11 years” (2004: 62) – including 
Democratic leaders and Republican moderates. 
In Maharidge analysis censorship had two main targets: the school system and 
the media network. As far as school is concerned, students’ denial of the freedom of 
speech couples with the control over the lessons’ contents, with teachers and 
professors fired for their anti-patriotic stands.5 
                                                
5 Analogous forms of control characterized the years of the Civil Rights Movement – as the history 
of John Tinker and his parents’ fight against racial discrimination in 1965 testifies (Maharidge 2004: 47). 
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The second context where the erasure of dissent was carried out systematically 
was the mass media: Daily Courier journalist Dan Gutherie was fired after his attacks on 
G. W. Bush; Dave D. contract was cancelled after his interview to Democrat Barbara Lee 
during his Street Knowledge radio show, while Bill Mahler TV show Politically Incorrect 
was stopped after his open criticism to US military attacks. Even Maharidge’s 
difficulties in finding an editor for Homeland, briefly hinted at in the narrative (due to 
the “islamism” of the book) is the last of many episodes testifying how, as Molly Ivins 
later noted in a talk to journalism students at Columbia University, “it was suddenly as 
if the American press […] were taking a page from King Louis XIV sycophantic court” 
(Ibid.: 18). 
Forms of control and repression reported by Homeland’s interviewees include 
FBI visits under the guise of seeking terrorism-related information or for the 
individuals’ political affiliation, and automatic detention of immigrants coming from 
those countries where Al-Qaeda is supposed to have more sympathizers. The summa 
and symbol of this repressive policy came to be the Patriot Act, passed in October 
2001, on the waves of the emotional impact of 9/11, that vastly expanded  wire-
tapping authority in order to monitor individuals and groups, the government power 
to detain anyone any time, and authorized the government to obtain personal 
information from every source, permit FBI agents to obtain a search warrant easily or 
to break into a home without any warrant. The paradoxes of guaranteeing citizens’ 
safety without de facto getting in the way of the interests of economic powers are 
unveiled by Maharidge in relation to the weapons industry and policy: whereas the 
Patriot Act allowed to check even the readings in the libraries, it denied the permit to 
keep records of gun purchase for more than twenty-four hours (an Ashcroft’s order, to 
please the National Rifle Association), although the FBI investigation found matches 
between terrorists and gun purchasing in the US. However, rather than an anomaly of 
the system, Maharidge shows how the laws of the market and private economic 
interests are not opposed to, but deeply entangled with the nationalistic rhetoric, 
since the strengthening of consent relies on the use of marketable goods. 
FROM CONSENT TO CONSUMPTION 
 
Strategies for consent and belonging have always been based on signs,  be they 
visual, written, auditory – often with a shifty, malleable meaning. As predictable, the 
media played a key role in the call up for unity: after 9/11, many radio stations 
transmitted at least once a day the national anthem and other patriotic music and 
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censored anti-war lyrics, while movies considered “unpatriotic” by the majors were not 
distributed. 
The signs of consent permeated not only the media, but the practices of every-
day life as well: from photographs to bumper stickers, cartoons and ribs, the explosion 
of signs after 9/11 has, according to Maharidge, no precedents in American history. 
The most recurrent symbol has been since then the American flag: Williamson’s 
photographs frame it everywhere, on the wall of a police department in West Virginia, 
on decals (one stating that “Sikh Americans Join All Americans In Prayer”, the other 
praising that “God, guns & guts made America, let’s keep all three”); painted on the 
door of a farmer’s truck; on the top of a van covered with homophobic and racist signs 
touring in Washington, DC; in the salt flats of Utah; in rally supporting the war in Iraq; 
on the wall of a veteran hall in Tennessee; held by babies during the Flag Day (and by 
their toys too) and even on bath-towels on the beach. 
Like “homeland”, the flag too has come to signify less and less a strictly 
affirmative belonging to a place, and more and more an antagonist attitude toward 
the “other”, be it within or outside the national boundaries. Maharidge locates the 
continuity of the fractious nature of the flag backward in time: first in the Confederate 
flags, still weaving in the village of Sissonville, “a manifestation of unity against a 
hostile world” (2004: 10) – where the hostile world is not the foreign, but the rest of 
the country. And then in the United States flag itself, now an emblem of the white 
minority,  opposed to ethnic groups: like in the white rallies in the poor 
neighbourhoods of Chicago during the celebration of the first anniversary of the 
Towers’ fall (which, in Maharidge’s description, resembles Nazi assemblies), where the 
“stars and stripes” is used as a nationalistic symbol testifying not common beliefs, but 
the common (white) race. “The white people can wave the American flag. The 
Mexicans, their flag. And I want to have my flag” (Ibid.: 99), says a young American-
Palestinian immigrant to the author, thus implicitly denouncing the exclusionary 
significance of the national emblem in the post 9/11 world. 
Used as shields against the racists’ anger, in order to avoid being the target of 
discrimination, flags abound in ethnic neighbourhood and communities too – another 
common trait with the German Heimat, as a woman of Indian descent, who grew up in 
Germany, underlined: “she too felt compelled to put a flag in her window, out of fear, 
to show she was not ‘other’. She’d conformed to the will of the masses. To her, that is 
what most made it Weimar. She was living in her own personal Weimar” (Ibid.: 158). 
However, as sign of membership, the flag is not a self-sustaining symbol that leads to 
automatic acceptance, but must be validated by a collective recognition. This is an 
occurrence that did not happen so often to many immigrants, nor even to some 
whites: the abundance of flags on the car of Katie Sierra’s mother did not prevent her 
being attacked and spit on by students because of her daughter’s political beliefs. 
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Apart from the inclusive/exclusive effects, signs of patriotism have another, 
significant corollary that casts light on the deep ambivalences of the national rhetoric 
in times of economic depression. Due to the highly emotional interaction, fuelled by 
the nationalistic ideology, among the members of the homeland (that are both 
citizens and consumers, culturally and materially) in times of crisis, patriotism became 
more and more intertwined with consumerism. From the “God Bless America/support 
our troops/I drive a Suv” quoted by Maharidge in the preface, to the flags and T-shirts 
with patriotic logos, the author shows how the “back to normalcy” invoked by 
President Bush equated patriotism with consumption. “The station manager urges me 
to go out and shop. That’s how we can be patriotic. Buy Buy Buy. Want that computer? 
Go out and change it. Show the terrorists they can’t win. Buy Buy Buy. Show the world 
we are strong.” (Ibid.: 139).  
Demonstrating the love for the home-country by turning into compulsive 
consumers means, to a certain extent, also the objectifying and consumption of 
violence in its many forms, from the 9/11 tragedy to the  wars. Both, as Maharidge 
suggests, have been turned into marketable goods: not only the transformation of 
Ground Zero into a tourist site (with its merchandising), but, even more important, the 
increase in sales of many products related to the warfare that speculate on people’s 
fears: protective equipments for chemical attacks, parachutes to jump from crumbling 
buildings, pills against radiations have been sold in large quantities after 9/11 not only 
in New York, but in many other American cities.  
“Buying the war” as a way to exorcise it leads also to the reproduction of war 
scenarios at home: this explains the rapid increase in sales (3,000 per month) of the 
Hummer 2 SUV, the expensive (50,000$ to 100,000$) civilian version of a tank 
patterned after the military vehicle used in the Gulf war and the Iraqi war, and deftly 
marketed by employing a war-like lexicon and images meant to evoke strength and 
protection. Even dissent can be marketed: in Sissonville (the centre of Katy Miller’s 
campaign for her freedom of speech) students are allowed to wear pre-printed shirts 
with unpatriotic political messages, while only the handmade ones are prohibited.  
The connection between the war and the market is so permeating that, in a 
probably unintentional faux pas of the government, war was shamelessly compared to 
a product. The launch of the campaign against Saddam Hussein after the summer 
holidays of 2002 was motivated by the fact that, as Andrew Card (George W. Bush’s 
Chief of Staff) explained, “From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new 
products in August” (Ibid.: 141). As Homeland shows, this rhetorical overlapping 
reveals the consolidation of a political vision moulded on the laws of the market – a 
vision that is, ultimately, the real culprit of American allegedly racial and religious 
conflicts.  
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ECONOMY, PATRIOTISM AND WAR  
 
Whereas most of the understanding of the consequences of 9/11 (and the first 
part of the text itself) has revolved primarily around the tension between national 
security and civil liberties (including the protection of the freedoms that United States 
constitution affirms to guarantee to foreigners), Homeland’s ultimate attempt is to 
show how the nationalist, xenophobic responses to 9/11 events have been the output 
of a social and economic distress ideologically manipulated and diverted in order to 
heal the growing rifts in the domestic social texture.  
As Joel Blau notes in his Illusions of Prosperity, “equating economic and political 
freedom, Americans have long associated markets with democracy”(1999: xi). Several 
paradoxes arise in a post 9/11 when “freedom” is more and more the synonym not of 
rights, but of the allowance to choose among different products on sale (Maharidge 
2004: 142) – the first being that a huge part of the citizens’ power to consume has 
been severely impaired by many years of economic recession.  
The scenario Maharidge and Williamson move in is that of a country split in two,  
 
two distinct Americas, one in the exclusive preserves of California’s Silicon Valley 
and Manhattan’s Upper West Side, the other in the country’s middle - in 
unheralded and wounded towns with names like Celina, Girard, and Lusk. The first 
country was living as if the 1990s boom would never cease. The second country 
was languishing, as if locked in a 1930s Great Depression time warp (Ibid: xlii). 
 
Most of Williamson’s photographs frame dilapidated houses, shattered windows, 
rainy and grey suburbs inhabited by people who look like survivors, rather than 
citizens. As the authors explored at length in their previous works, the ongoing 
impoverishment of the working class and the increasing gap between the rich and the 
poor have been mainly the result of  the neoliberal policies from the Seventies onward 
– clearly antecedent to 9/11: “Before that day we were already a nation in which 
executives burned shareholders’ money on $ 2 million toga birthday parties, while 
men and women who worked Wal-Mart jobs pinched pennies and still ended up 
begging for charity food for their children at month’s end” (Ibid.: xliii). While on the 
one hand the United States was marketed as a fast growing and increasingly richer 
society where the old economy was replaced by a new one based on intellectual 
property, stock options and bonuses (and where a journalist of the Washington Post 
dared to write that “if you are relatively young today and you don’t become a 
millionaire by the time you retire, you have few excuses” – (Ibid.: 66), Maharidge 
documents a large number of people either unemployed, or whose wages have been 
cut dramatically with the shift from a unionised secondary-sector to a de-regulated 
economy of services. The “more at less” marketing strategy, that apparently meant to 
favour the working and middle-class Americans as consumers, has deeply damaged 
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them as workers. This has created, in Maharidge’s words, a “Brazilianization of America 
– a growing Third World amid the First World” (Ibid.: 154) extending, according to the 
authors’ survey, for more than eight hundred miles in the centre of the continent, from 
the Rust Belt to the Appalachian countries, as well as in suburban and ethnically 
heterogeneous neighbourhoods. The degrading social citizenship of this huge part of 
American population has then been the consequence of a country organized around 
corporate priorities, an “imperial homeland” (Maskovsky 2009: 4), whose domestic 
economic reverberations ended up being very different from the ones depicted by the 
hegemonic discourse. 
The short-circuit generated by economic distress on the one hand and 
nationalist rhetoric on the other is the focal point of Homeland analysis: Maharidge 
documents how religious crusades and battles between fundamentalisms, xenofobia 
and the rise of ultra-conservative movements (that found rich soil among poor whites 
in particular) have worked as  catalysts of anger generating in poor standards of living: 
“Everywhere I turned in Chicago, I witnessed anger. Nancy, Jim, and Patrick were 
among several dozens whites with similar stories. The ones I heard were depressingly 
repetitive. Prick the anger which on the surface may be pro-war and anti-Arab, and 
one hears of ruined 401Ks, health problems, lost work.” (Maharidge 2004: 106)  
Not only the emphasis on security and the targeting of immigrants have been 
the way to direct attention away from unemployment, annihilation of welfare and 
health programs, and the conspicuous shift of many from the working class to the 
underclass. That same emphasis, coupled with the wide-spreading of nationalism, has 
been the way to substitute the lack of social and economic power lost by many, with 
an ideal power allegedly gained by identifying with the ideals and symbols of the 
rapacious politics of their own nation state – without realising that it was precisely that 
politics the main cause of distress,  
 
By the winter of 2002, when we talked, I had begun to view what was going on in 
the country as nationalism - one could often substitute the word ‘nationalism’ 
where the word ‘patriotism’ was being used. One can define nationalism in many 
ways, and John saw a foundation in economic distress. ‘Basically, being the have-
nots in society, they gain some sense of security out of an authoritarianism in their 
local culture’ (Ibid.: 51).  
 
However, whether the resurrection of the “homeland” ideology has been aimed 
both at creating a shared and exclusionary feeling of cultural belonging and political 
membership, and at forcing a counteraction to the crisis with acts of pride and loyalty 
to the home-country, 6 it has also ended up by exposing, in Maharidge’s perusal, the 
                                                
6	  Including	  the	  demission	  to	  their	  own	  rights	  –	  like	  welfare,	  in	  name	  of	  that	  same	  rhetoric	  of	  pride.	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saggi/Ensayos/Essais/Essays 
9/11/2011 – 11/2011     
322 
paradoxes of such a rhetoric. The exacerbation of the class distances, the increase of 
unemployment, the scarcity of well-paid jobs, together with the lack of prospects for 
the youngest allow to think that in the present, and even more in the future, less and 
less people can and will be able to fit under the safe roof of the home-land. One of the 
best examples described by Maharidge is Charlie, the sixteen-years old boy that, 
together with many others who hate Arabs and other racial minorities, marched on 
the local mosque in suburban Chicago after 9/11,  
 
Charlie and his friends are lost suburban kids who know their place in a service 
economy – a place far below the bottom rung on the ladder of success. Charlie 
might not be the brightest kid, but he knew his future. […] Charlie’s parents had 
hung on somehow during the three-decade onslaught waged upon them, and 
they raised a son who is about to begin his adult life defeated. Now Charlie 
without-a-future was with us – a whole army of Wal-Mart Charlies – friends that 
fuck, with HATE on their fists. We Sell for Less. Always. Charlie is a product, 
manufactured by those who live up in Kenilworth and Winnetka on the shores of 
Lake Michigan, over in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, on Manhattan’s Upper East 
Side, out in the Woodside hills overlooking the glittering Silicon Valley (Ibid.: 108). 
 
In these political and economic scenarios, the resurgence of “homeland” can be 
seen as sadly ironic in a period when more and more people are going to become 
homeless. The nationalistic rhetoric and the fact that not everybody can fit under the 
common refuge of the homeland is nevertheless functional to a different type of 
economic network - transnational rather than national, capable of absorbing the 
redundancies that the same forces of globalization generated,  
 
The morning of 9/11, I stood on my Manhattan rooftop wondering about the 
genie being unleashed. Now here was Charlie, eager for any excuse to stomp 
someone, something, anything. He was hitting Arabs that Christmas season, but 
Charlie later exercised his best option: about a year after we met, he joined the 
U.S. Military (Ibid.: 108). 
 
The evocative power of “homeland” continues to rely on the skilful concealing of 
the consequences of American new imperialism (Harvey 2003), both abroad and at 
home. Here anger, harvested through patriotism and war scenarios, creates both 
domestic consent (and surveillance) and workforce for the battlefields. To the soldiers, 
“homeland” becomes again a far away place to “come home to”, rather than to live in; 
a territorial fortification excluding, rather than including, its weakest members.  
Homeland can in this sense be read as a narrative of resistance: first, against a 
consumption of images and stories that would isolate 9/11 from historical flow and 
prevent the emergence of the intricate web of connections linking politics, culture and 
economy. Second, by resisting all the dichotomies that hegemonic discourse has 
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created in order to rouse uncritical affiliation, be they religious, racial, cultural or 
political. From the local of Kate Sierra’s struggle to the global of  international wars, 
and then backwards, toward the domestic effects of the transnational economy, the 
American “homeland” depicted by the text is a highly controversial signifier, that by 
subverting the same founding premises of the national ideology forgets how, as 
Benjamin Franklin wrote (and Maharidge reminds us), “Those who would give up 
essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety” 
(1834: 99). 
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